# The Credit Crisis in Commercial Real Estate




### Summary

- Commercial real estate accounts for a meaningful 6% of GDP
- Commercial real estate entered the downturn reasonably well balanced
- However, \$400 billion of CRE debt matures by the end of 2009, and another
   \$800 billion matures in 2010 and 2011
- According to S&P, another \$800 billion of corporate debt matures on 2009
- Two largest sources of CRE debt are banks and CMBS
- Banks are not lending, and the CMBS market is closed
- Lending terms, when available, are ruinous and assets cannot be sold
- Performing loans must be refinanced to avoid asset price deflation
- Super-senior AAA-rated debt trades at 15% yields to maturity
- AAA-rated debt requires Treasury support to establish price discovery





# Commercial Real Estate Debt and Equity Investment-grade, income-producing real estate \$6.5 trillion as of December 2007






### Commercial Real Estate Debt and Equity Public and Private Ownership as of December 2007





### Commercial Mortgage Debt Outstanding By source of funds




### Publicly Traded Real Estate Equity (REITs) A window on commercial real estate equity finance

- 101 companies listed on the NYSE
- 74% investment grade by equity market capitalization
- \$600 billion of property owned at year-end 2007
- Leverage ratio of 60% compared with 40% at the end of 2007
- Fixed charge ratio of 2.6
- \$19.5 billion of dividends paid to shareholders in 2007
- Average daily trading volume of \$5 billion
- Share returns lead measured returns in property markets by 6-18 months
  - Share returns peaked early in 2007 and have since declined 62.8%

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
## Commercial Real Estate Debt Maturities Including secured and unsecured debt

#### **Debt Maturities by Year**




## Public Company Debt Maturities Investment grade unsecured debt

#### **Unsecured Investment Grade Bond Maturities (BAA1/BAA2)**




# Publicly Traded Real Estate Debt (CMBS) A window on commercial real estate debt finance Annual maturity schedule


Overall U.S. CMBS Maturities by Year



### Commercial Real Estate Loans at Banks CRE credit standards: 1997 - 2008




## Commercial Real Estate Loans at Banks CRE lending volume: 1989 - 2008




Note: Data through November 19, 2008 Source: Federal Reserve Board

### Securitized Commercial Real Estate Loans CMBS issuance volume: 1999 - 2008




# CMBS Credit Spreads CMBS yield less 10-year Treasury yield




Note: Data through November 30, 2008 Source: Morgan Stanley

### Commercial Real Estate Transactions Transaction volume: 2001 – 2008




### CMBS and Residential Mortgage Delinquencies 1999 – 2008:Q2




Note: Delinquency rates are for fixed-rate, conduit CMBS transactions. 60+ excludes 30-day delinquencies. Source: Trepp, CMSA, and Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey



### Nationwide Core Property Vacancy Rates 1983 – 2008:Q3



### Securities Offerings by Public Companies



#### Policy Actions to Stabilize Financial Markets

- Banks must be encouraged or required, as a condition for Treasury or Fed liquidity assistance, to refinance performing commercial mortgages and unsecured credit facilities reaching maturity
- The Treasury should allocate a portion of the remaining funds under TARP as equity to capitalize a Federal Reserve liquidity facility for new commercial mortgages and unsecured commercial real estate loans, permitting credit markets to restart and clear in an orderly fashion
- Foreign equity capital should be encouraged and barriers to such investment (such as the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act or FIRPTA) should be revised
- Real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC) rules should be amended to facilitate reasonable modifications to the terms of loans securitized through CMBS
- Accounting rules for "mark-to-market" and "consolidation" must adapt to the current capital markets crisis